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We study the efficiency properties of a dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium, macroeconomic model
with monopolistic competition and firm entry subject to sunk costs, a time-to-build lag, and exogenous
risk of firm destruction. Under inelastic labor supply and linearity of production in labor, the market
economy is efficient if and only if symmetric, homothetic preferences are of the C.E.S. form studied
by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Otherwise, efficiency is restored by properly designed sales, entry, or
asset trade subsidies (or taxes) that induce markup synchronization across time and states, and align
the consumer surplus and profit destruction effects of firm entry. When labor supply is elastic, heterogeneity
in markups across consumption and leisure introduces an additional distortion. Efficiency is then restored
by subsidizing labor at a rate equal to the markup in the market for goods. Our results highlight the
importance of preserving the optimal amount of monopoly profits in economies in which firm entry
is costly. Inducing marginal cost pricing restores efficiency only when the required sales subsidies
are financed with the optimal split of lump-sum taxation between households and firms.¸
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What are the consequences of monopoly power for e¢ ciency of business cycle ￿ uctuations and new
product creation? If market power results in ine¢ ciency, what tools can the policymaker employ
to maximize social welfare and restore e¢ ciency? We address these questions in the context of
the dynamic, stochastic, general equilibrium (DSGE) model with monopolistic competition and
endogenous product creation developed in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007 ￿henceforth, BGM).
Speci￿cally, we compare the competitive and planner equilibria, asking whether the market solution
generates e¢ cient responses to exogenous shocks and the optimum amount of product variety when
product creation is subject to sunk costs, a time-to-build lag, and an obsolescence risk. We then
analyze ￿scal policies that ensure implementation of the Pareto optimum as a competitive equilib-
rium when e¢ ciency of the market solution fails. The policy schemes that implement e¢ ciency in
our model fully specify the optimal path of the relevant distortionary instruments over the business
cycles triggered by unexpected shocks to productivity and entry costs.1
In BGM, we argued that creation of new products is an important mechanism for business cycle
propagation. Endogenous product creation subject to sunk entry costs provides a new mechanism
of propagation and ampli￿cation of shocks (for instance, to technology) and makes it possible to
reconcile theory with stylized facts on ￿rm entry, product creation, and the cyclicality of pro￿ts
and markups. By studying the e¢ ciency properties of our DSGE model, this paper contributes to
the literature on the e¢ ciency properties of monopolistic competition started by the original work
of Lerner (1934) and developed by Samuelson (1947), Chamberlin (1950), Spence (1976), Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977), Judd (1985a), and Grossman and Helpman (1991), among others.2
Under assumptions of inelastic labor supply and linearity of production in labor, our main result
is that a monopolistically competitive market generates socially e¢ cient economic ￿ uctuations and
product entry (that is, the competitive and planner equilibria coincide) when consumers have
symmetric, homothetic preferences exhibiting love for variety if and only if preferences are such
that: (i) markups are synchronized over time and across states; and (ii) the bene￿t of variety in
elasticity form is functionally identical to the net markup in the pricing of goods (the pro￿t signal
driving entry). This requires that preferences be of the C.E.S. form originally studied by Dixit and
Stiglitz (1977).
1In BGM, we focus on productivity as the sole source of business cycle shocks. Here, we allow also for random
￿ uctuations in entry costs to highlight the generality of the properties of the policy schemes we consider.
2See also Mankiw and Whinston (1986), Benassy (1996), and Kim (2004).
1E¢ ciency also requires that markups be synchronized across all items that bring utility (or
disutility) to consumers. We show this by considering the case of endogenous labor supply, thereby
introducing a leisure good that is not subject to a markup. The competitive equilibrium is then no
longer e¢ cient. However, the relevant distortion is not the existence of a markup in the market for
goods, but heterogeneity in markups between all ￿goods￿consumed: consumption goods and leisure
(priced at ￿marginal cost￿in a competitive labor market). It is this heterogeneity in markups that
results in a wedge between marginal rates of substitution and transformation between consumption
and leisure that distorts labor supply.
When the conditions above fail, and hence the market economy is ine¢ cient, the policymaker
can use a variety of ￿scal instruments (in conjunction with lump-sum taxes or transfers) to ensure
implementation of the ￿rst-best equilibrium. With inelastic labor supply, a properly designed sales
subsidy can remove the e⁄ects of both intertemporal markup variation and non-synchronization of
the gains from variety with the pro￿t incentive for entry. The same e⁄ect can be obtained with a
proportional entry cost subsidy, a subsidy to net stock market trades, or a tax on gross trades.
When labor supply is elastic, e¢ ciency is restored if the government taxes leisure (or subsidizes
labor supply) at a rate equal to the net markup in consumption goods prices, even if goods remain
priced above marginal cost. While this result also holds in a model with a ￿xed number of ￿rms, an
equivalent optimal policy in that setup would have the markup removed by a proportional revenue
subsidy. In our model, such a policy of inducing marginal cost pricing ￿if ￿nanced with lump-sum
taxation of ￿rm pro￿ts ￿would eliminate entry incentives, since the sunk entry cost could not
be covered in the absence of pro￿ts.3 In fact, we show that inducing marginal cost pricing can
implement the e¢ cient equilibrium in our model only when the lump-sum taxation that ￿nances
the necessary sales subsidy is optimally split between households and ￿rms, and that this requires
zero lump-sum taxation of ￿rm pro￿ts when preferences are of the form studied by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977).
Our results reiterate an argument made elsewhere in the literature that monopoly power in and
of itself is not a distortion, and show that monopoly pro￿ts should in fact be preserved whenever
entry is endogenously determined. Indeed, while markup synchronization across time, states, and
goods is still a necessary condition for e¢ ciency, su¢ ciency requires that markups also be aligned
with the bene￿t of additional product variety. Our ￿ndings are also closely related to a large body
3We are implicitly assuming that the government is not contemporaneously subsidizing the entire amount of the
entry cost.
2of literature studying optimal monetary and ￿scal policy in the presence of monopolistic competi-
tion; however, our results stand in sharp contrast to the common policy prescription eliminating
monopoly pro￿ts. When product variety is endogenously determined by ￿rm entry, monopoly
pro￿ts play a crucial role in generating the welfare maximizing level of product variety.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the benchmark model with ￿xed
labor supply and characterizes the competitive equilibrium. Section 3 studies the problem facing
a social planner for our model economy. Section 4 states and proves our welfare theorem, and
discusses the intuition for it. Section 5 extends the analysis to the case of endogenous labor supply.
Section 6 studies optimal ￿scal policies that implement the ￿rst-best allocation and is followed by
a discussion in Section 7 relating our results to the existing literature. Section 8 concludes.
2 Model: The Market Economy
Household Preferences
The economy is populated by a unit mass of atomistic households. All contracts and prices are
written in nominal terms. Prices are ￿ exible. Thus, we only solve for real variables in the model.
However, as the composition of the consumption basket changes over time due to ￿rm entry (af-
fecting the de￿nition of the consumption-based price index), we introduce money as a convenient
unit of account for contracts. Money plays no other role in the economy. For this reason, we do
not model the demand for cash currency, and resort to a cashless economy as in Woodford (2003).
We begin by assuming that the representative household supplies L units of labor inelastically in
each period at the nominal wage rate Wt. The household maximizes expected intertemporal utility
from consumption (C): Et
P1
s=t ￿s￿tU (Cs), where ￿ 2 (0;1) is the subjective discount factor and
U (C) is a period utility function with the standard properties. At time t, the household consumes
the basket of goods Ct, de￿ned over a continuum of goods ￿. At any given time t, only a subset
of goods ￿t ￿ ￿ is available. Let pt (!) denote the nominal price of a good ! 2 ￿t. Our model can
be solved for any parametrization of symmetric homothetic preferences. For any such preferences,
there exists a well de￿ned consumption index Ct and an associated welfare-based price index Pt.
The demand for an individual variety, ct (!), is then obtained as ct(!)d! = Ct@Pt=@pt(!), where
we use the conventional notation for quantities with a continuum of goods as ￿ ow values.4
Given the demand for an individual variety, ct(!), the symmetric price elasticity of demand ￿
4See the appendix for more details.






; for any symmetric variety !:
The bene￿t of additional product variety is described by the relative price ￿:
￿t (!) = ￿(Nt) ￿
pt(!)
Pt
; for any symmetric variety !;





Together, ￿(Nt) and ￿(Nt) completely characterize the e⁄ects of preferences over consumption goods
in our model; explicit expressions can be obtained for these objects upon specifying functional forms
for preferences, as will become clear in the discussion below.
Firms
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive ￿rms, each producing a di⁄erent variety
! 2 ￿. Production requires only one factor, labor. Aggregate labor productivity is indexed by
Zt, which represents the e⁄ectiveness of one unit of labor. Zt is exogenous and follows an AR(1)
process (in logarithms). Output supplied by ￿rm ! is yt (!) = Ztlt (!), where lt (!) is the ￿rm￿ s
labor demand for productive purposes. The unit cost of production, in units of the consumption
good Ct, is wt=Zt, where wt ￿ Wt=Pt is the real wage.5
Prior to entry, ￿rms face a sunk entry cost of fE;t e⁄ective labor units, equal to wtfE;t=Zt units
of the consumption basket. fE;t is exogenous and follows an AR(1) process (in logarithms). There
are no ￿xed production costs. Hence, all ￿rms that enter the economy produce in every period,
until they are hit with a ￿death￿shock, which occurs with probability ￿ 2 (0;1) in every period.6
Given our modeling assumption relating each ￿rm to an individual variety, we think of a ￿rm as
a production line for that variety, and the entry cost as the development and setup cost associated
with the latter (potentially in￿ uenced by market regulation). The exogenous ￿death￿shock also
takes place at the individual variety level. Empirically, a ￿rm may comprise more than one of these
production lines, but ￿for simplicity ￿our model does not address the determination of product
5Consistent with standard real business cycle theory, aggregate productivity Zt a⁄ects all ￿rms uniformly.
6For simplicity, we do not consider endogenous exit. As we show in BGM, appropriate calibration of ￿ makes it
possible for our model to match several important features of the data.
4variety within ￿rms.
Firms set prices in a ￿ exible fashion as markups over marginal costs. In units of consumption,
￿rm !￿ s price is ￿t (!) = ￿twt=Zt, where the markup ￿t is in general a function of the number of
producers: ￿t = ￿(Nt) ￿ ￿(Nt)=(￿(Nt) + 1): The ￿rm￿ s pro￿t in units of consumption, returned






t =Nt; where Y C
t is total output of the
consumption basket and will in equilibrium be equal to total consumption demand Ct.
Preference Speci￿cations and Markups
We consider three alternative preference speci￿cations as special cases for illustrative purposes
below. The ￿rst features a constant elasticity of substitution (C.E.S.) between goods, as in Dixit and






; where ￿ > 1 is the symmetric elasticity of substitution across






household￿ s demand for each individual good ! is ct (!) = (pt (!)=Pt)
￿￿ Ct. It follows that the
markup and the bene￿t of variety are independent of the number of goods: ￿(Nt) = ￿, ￿(Nt) = ￿;
and they are related by: ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1 = 1=(￿ ￿ 1). The second speci￿cation is the C.E.S. variant
introduced by Benassy (1996), which disentangles monopoly power (measured by the net markup
1=(￿ ￿ 1)) and consumer love for variety, captured by a parameter ￿ > 0. With this speci￿cation,







. The third speci￿cation
uses the translog expenditure function proposed by Feenstra (2003), which introduces demand-
side pricing complementarities. For this preference speci￿cation, the symmetric price elasticity of
demand is 1 + ￿Nt, ￿ > 0: As Nt increases, goods become closer substitutes, and the elasticity of
substitution increases. If goods are closer substitutes, then the markup ￿(Nt) and the bene￿t of
additional varieties in elasticity form (￿(Nt)) must decrease.7 The change in ￿(Nt) is only half the
change in the net markup generated by an increase in the number of producers. Table 1 contains the
expressions for markup, relative price, and bene￿t of variety in elasticity form for each preference
speci￿cation.
7This property for the markup occurs whenever the price elasticity of residual demand decreases with quantity
consumed along the residual demand curve.
5Table 1. Three Frameworks
C.E.S.-DS C.E.S.-Benassy Translog
￿(Nt) = ￿ = ￿
￿￿1 ￿t = ￿ = ￿





￿￿1 ￿(Nt) = (Nt)




￿ ~ NNt ; ~ N ￿ Mass(￿)
￿(Nt) = ￿ ￿ 1 ￿(Nt) = ￿ ￿(Nt) = 1
2￿Nt = 1
2 (￿(Nt) ￿ 1)
Firm Entry and Exit
In every period, there is a mass Nt of ￿rms producing in the economy and an unbounded mass of
prospective entrants. These entrants are forward looking, and correctly anticipate their expected
future pro￿ts ds (!) in every period s ￿ t + 1 as well as the probability ￿ (in every period) of
incurring the exit-inducing shock. Entrants at time t only start producing at time t + 1, which
introduces a one-period time-to-build lag in the model. The exogenous exit shock occurs at the
very end of the time period (after production and entry). A proportion ￿ of new entrants will
therefore never produce. Prospective entrants in period t compute their expected post-entry value
(vt (!)) given by the present discounted value of their expected stream of pro￿ts fds (!)g1
s=t+1:
vt (!) = Et
1 X
s=t+1




This also represents the value of incumbent ￿rms after production has occurred (since both new
entrants and incumbents then face the same probability 1 ￿ ￿ of survival and production in the
subsequent period). Entry occurs until ￿rm value is equalized with the entry cost, leading to the
free entry condition vt (!) = wtfE;t=Zt. This condition holds so long as the mass NE;t of entrants
is positive. We assume that macroeconomic shocks are small enough for this condition to hold
in every period.8 Finally, the timing of entry and production we have assumed implies that the
number of producing ￿rms during period t is given by Nt = (1 ￿ ￿)(Nt￿1 + NE;t￿1). The number
of producing ￿rms represents the capital stock of the economy. It is an endogenous state variable
that behaves much like physical capital in the benchmark real business cycle (RBC) model.
8Periods with zero entry (NE;t = 0) may occur as a consequence of large enough (adverse) exogenous shocks. In
these periods, the free entry condition would hold as a strict inequality: vt (!) < wtfE;t=Zt:
6Symmetric Firm Equilibrium
All ￿rms face the same marginal cost. Hence, equilibrium prices, quantities, and ￿rm values are
identical across ￿rms: pt (!) = pt, ￿t (!) = ￿t, lt (!) = lt, yt (!) = yt, dt (!) = dt, vt (!) = vt.
In turn, equality of prices across ￿rms implies that the consumption-based price index Pt and the
￿rm-level price pt are such that pt=Pt ￿ ￿t = ￿(Nt). An increase in the number of ￿rms implies
necessarily that the relative price of each individual good increases ￿0 (Nt) > 0. When there are
more ￿rms, households derive more welfare from spending a given nominal amount, i.e., ceteris
paribus, the price index decreases. It follows that the relative price of each individual good must
rise. The aggregate consumption output of the economy is Y C
t = Nt￿tyt = Ct.
Importantly, in the symmetric ￿rm equilibrium, the value of waiting to enter is zero, despite the
entry decision being subject to sunk costs and exit risk; i.e., there are no option-value considerations
pertaining to the entry decision. This happens because all uncertainty in our model (including the
￿death￿shock) is aggregate.9
Household Budget Constraint and Intertemporal Decisions
We assume without loss of generality that households hold only shares in a mutual fund of ￿rms.
Let xt be the share in the mutual fund of ￿rms held by the representative household entering period
t. The mutual fund pays a total pro￿t in each period (in units of currency) equal to the total pro￿t
of all ￿rms that produce in that period, PtNtdt. During period t, the representative household buys
xt+1 shares in a mutual fund of NH;t ￿ Nt + NE;t ￿rms (those already operating at time t and the
new entrants). Only Nt+1 = (1 ￿ ￿)NH;t ￿rms will produce and pay dividends at time t+1. Since
the household does not know which ￿rms will be hit by the exogenous exit shock ￿ at the very end
of period t, it ￿nances the continuing operation of all pre-existing ￿rms and all new entrants during
period t. The date t price (in units of currency) of a claim to the future pro￿t stream of the mutual
fund of NH;t ￿rms is equal to the nominal price of claims to future ￿rm pro￿ts, Ptvt.
The household enters period t with mutual fund share holdings xt and receives dividend income
and the value of selling its initial share position, and labor income. The household allocates these
resources between purchases of shares to be carried into next period, consumption, and lump-sum
9See the appendix for the proof. In this paper, we assume that the exogenous shocks are small enough to rule out
this possibility.
7taxes Tt levied by the government. The period budget constraint (in units of consumption) is:
vtNH;txt+1 + Ct + Tt = (dt + vt)Ntxt + wtL: (2)
The household maximizes its expected intertemporal utility subject to (2). The Euler equation
for share holdings is:







As expected, forward iteration of this equation and absence of speculative bubbles yield the asset
price solution in equation (1).10
Aggregate Accounting and Equilibrium
Aggregating the budget constraint (2) across households and imposing the equilibrium condition
xt+1 = xt = 1 8t yields the aggregate accounting identity Ct + NE;tvt = wtL + Ntdt: Total
consumption plus investment (in new ￿rms) must be equal to total income (labor income plus
dividend income).
Di⁄erent from the benchmark, one-sector, RBC model, our model economy is a two-sector
economy in which one sector employs part of the labor endowment to produce consumption and
the other sector employs the rest of the labor endowment to produce new ￿rms. The economy￿ s
GDP, Yt, is equal to total income, wtL + Ntdt. In turn, Yt is also the total output of the economy,
given by consumption output, Y C
t (= Ct), plus investment output, NE;tvt. With this in mind, vt is
the relative price of the investment ￿good￿in terms of consumption.
Labor market equilibrium requires that the total amount of labor used in production and to set
up the new entrants￿plants must equal aggregate labor supply: LC
t + LE
t = L, where LC
t = Ntlt
is the total amount of labor used in production of consumption, and LE
t = NE;tfE;t=Zt is labor
used to build new ￿rms. In the benchmark RBC model, physical capital is accumulated by using
as investment part of the output of the same good used for consumption. In other words, all labor
is allocated to the only productive sector of the economy. When labor supply is ￿xed, there are no
labor market dynamics in the model, other than the determination of the equilibrium wage along
a vertical supply curve. In our model, even when labor supply is ￿xed, labor market dynamics
arise in the allocation of labor between production of consumption and creation of new plants.
The allocation is determined jointly by the entry decision of prospective entrants and the portfolio
10We omit the transversality condition that must be satis￿ed to ensure optimality.
8decision of households who ￿nance that entry. The value of ￿rms, or the relative price of investment
in terms of consumption vt, plays a crucial role in determining this allocation.11
The Competitive Equilibrium
The model with general homothetic preferences is summarized in Table 2.12
Table 2. Model Summary
Pricing ￿t = ￿t
wt
Zt
Variety e⁄ect ￿t = ￿(Nt)








Free entry vt = wt
fE;t
Zt
Number of ￿rms Nt = (1 ￿ ￿)(Nt￿1 + NE;t￿1)
Euler equation vt = ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)Et
h
U0(Ct+1)
U0(Ct) (vt+1 + dt+1)
i
Aggregate accounting Ct + NE;tvt = wtL + Ntdt
We can reduce the system in Table 2 to a system of two equations in two variables, Nt and Ct.
To see this, write ￿rm value as a function of the endogenous state Nt and the exogenous state fE;t





By substitution of the equilibrium conditions in Table 2, the Euler equation for shares becomes:



















The number of new entrants as a function of consumption and number of ￿rms is NE;t =
ZtL=fE;t ￿ Ct=(fE;t￿(Nt)). Substituting this into the law of motion for Nt (scrolled forward one
11When labor supply is elastic, labor market dynamics operate along two margins as the interaction of household
and ￿rm decisions determines jointly the total amount of labor and its allocation to the two sectors of the economy.
12The labor market equilibrium condition is redundant once the variety e⁄ect equation is included in the system
in Table 2.
9period) yields:










We are now in a position to de￿ne a competitive equilibrium of our economy.13
De￿nition 1: A Competitive Equilibrium (CE) consists of a 2-tuple fCt;Nt+1g satisfying (4)
and (5) for a given initial value N0 and a transversality condition for investment in shares.
The system of stochastic di⁄erence equations (4) and (5) has a unique stationary equilibrium
under the following conditions. A steady-state CE satis￿es:




















where r ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)=￿.14
The steady-state number of ￿rms in the CE, NCE, is a ￿xed point of HCE (N): We assume that
limN!0 ￿(N) = 1 and limN!1 ￿(N) = 1: Since HCE (N) is continuous, limN!0 HCE (N) = 1,
and limN!1 HCE (N) = 0;
￿
HCE (N)
￿0 ￿ 0 is a su¢ cient and locally necessary condition for












￿0 ￿ 0 is equivalent to ￿0 (N) ￿ 0.
The intuition for the uniqueness condition is that more product variety leads to a ￿crowding in￿
of the product space and goods becoming closer substitutes (with C.E.S. a limiting case). This is a
13It is understood that we use ￿ competitive equilibrium￿to refer to the equilibrium of the market economy in which
￿rms compete in the assumed monopolistically competitive fashion with no intervention of the policymaker in the
economy. Thus, the use of the word ￿ competitive￿implies no reference to perfect competition.
14Allowing households to hold bonds in our model would simply pin down the real interest rate as a function of
the expected path of consumption determined by the system in Table 2. In steady state, the real interest rate would
be such that ￿ (1 + r) = 1. For notational convenience, we thus replace the expression (1 ￿ ￿)=￿ with r when the
equations in Table 2 imply the presence of such term.
10very reasonable condition: If goods were to become more di⁄erentiated as product variety increases,
then the possibility of multiple equilibria would be apparent: There could be one equilibrium with
many ￿rms charging high markups and producing little, and another with few ￿rms charging low
markups and producing relatively more.
In BGM, we study the business cycle properties of the competitive equilibrium.15 In the present
paper, we compare the competitive equilibrium with the planning optimum.
3 The Planning (Pareto) Optimum
Given the model of the previous section, we now study a hypothetical scenario in which a benevolent
planner maximizes lifetime utility of the representative household by choosing quantities directly
(including the number of goods produced).
The ￿production function￿for aggregate consumption output is Ct = Zt￿(Nt)LC
t . Hence, the














































As we show in the appendix, the ￿rst-order condition for this problem can be written as:










This equation, together with the dynamic constraint (5) (which is the same under the competitive
and planner equilibria), leads to the following de￿nition.
De￿nition 2: A Planning Equilibrium (PE) consists of a 2-tuple fCt;Nt+1g satisfying (5) and
(7) for a given initial value N0:
The conditions for uniqueness of the stationary PE are similar to those for the CE found in the
15We show there that the competitive equilibrium is always locally determinate in the log-linearized version of our
model.
11previous section. The steady-state number of ￿rms NPE is the ￿xed point of a function similar to








Therefore, the conditions limN!0 ￿(N) = 1, limN!1 ￿(N) = 0, and ￿0 (N) ￿ 0 ensure that the
system of stochastic di⁄erence equations (5) and (7) has a unique stationary equilibrium.16 The
intuition for these uniqueness conditions is analogous to the one for the competitive equilibrium:
More product variety leads to a ￿crowding in￿of product space and goods become closer substitutes
(with C.E.S. a limiting case). In the PE case, this requires decreasing returns to increased product
variety (very similar to the condition that goods become closer substitutes). C.E.S. is again a
limiting case where there are ￿constant elasticity returns￿to increased product variety: Doubling
product variety, holding spending constant, always increases welfare by the same percentage.
4 A Welfare Theorem
We now state our main theorem, which provides the conditions under which the competitive (CE)
and planner (PE) equilibria coincide with strictly positive entry costs.17
Theorem 1 The Competitive and Planner equilibria are equivalent ￿i.e., CE , PE ￿if and only
if the following two conditions are jointly satis￿ed:
(i) ￿(Nt) = ￿(Nt+1) = ￿ and
(ii) the elasticity of product variety and the markup functions are such that ￿(x) = ￿(x) ￿ 1.
Proof. Su¢ ciency (￿ if￿ ) is directly veri￿ed by plugging conditions (i) and (ii) into (4) and (7).
Necessity (￿ only if￿ ) requires that, whenever both (4) and (7) are satis￿ed, then (i) and (ii) hold.
We prove this by contradiction. We ￿rst look at the simpler perfect-foresight case (where we can
drop the expectations operator) and then extend our proof to the stochastic case.
Suppose by reductio ad absurdum that there exists a 2-tuple fCt;Nt+1g that is both a CE and
a PE, with ￿(Nt) 6= ￿(Nt+1) or ￿(x) 6= ￿(x) ￿ 1 or both. We examine each case separately.
(A) ￿(Nt) 6= ￿(Nt+1) and ￿(x) = ￿(x) ￿ 1:
16Note that the solution for the stationary PE can be obtained by replacing the net markup function ￿(N) in the
stationary CE solution with the bene￿t of variety function ￿(N):
17We focus on situations where a strictly positive sunk cost (related to technology or regulation) is associated with
creating new ￿rms.


















After further simpli￿cation, using ￿(Nt) 6= ￿(Nt+1) and U0 (Ct+1) 6= 0, this yields:
1 ￿ ￿(Nt+1) =
fE;t+1￿(Nt+1)Nt+1
Ct+1
￿ 0; since ￿(Nt+1) ￿ 1: (9)
But this is a contradiction, since all terms on the right-hand side are strictly positive.













which is a contradiction since ￿(Nt) 6= ￿(Nt+1), U0 (Ct+1) 6= 0, and the term in square brackets is
strictly greater than zero (￿(Nt+1) ￿ 1).
(B) ￿(Nt) = ￿(Nt+1) = ￿ and ￿(x) 6= ￿(x) ￿ 1:




[￿(Nt+1) ￿ (￿ ￿ 1)] = 0: (10)
This would further imply that either U0 (Ct+1) = 0 or Ct+1 = 0 or ￿(Nt+1) = ￿ ￿ 1, which are all
contradictions.
(C) ￿(Nt) 6= ￿(Nt+1) and ￿(x) 6= ￿(x) ￿ 1:
In this case, a steady state is still de￿ned by Nt = Nt+1, so ￿(Nt) = ￿(Nt+1) = ￿(N) in steady
state. If the CE and PE equilibria are identical, then (evaluating the Euler equations at the steady
state) ￿(N) = ￿(N) ￿ 1, which contradicts the assumption ￿(x) 6= ￿(x) ￿ 1: This holds for the
stochastic case too (note that the same argument can be used in part (B), including the stochastic
case).
The conditions of Theorem 1 basically imply that, for e¢ ciency to obtain, preferences must be
of the C.E.S. form studied by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). We ￿rst discuss this special case (where
the conditions of our welfare theorem hold) and then describe alternative cases where e¢ ciency
fails.
13Before we do so, we discuss some properties of the steady state. A su¢ cient condition for the
number of ￿rms in the CE, NCE, to be lower (higher) than the number of ￿rms in the PE, NPE, is
that the graph of HCE (N) lie below (above) the graph of HPE (N) for any N; or equivalently that
￿(N)￿1 < (>)￿(N); 8N. This condition states that if, for a given number of producers, the pro￿t
incentives provided by the markup are weaker (stronger) than the variety e⁄ect on welfare, then the
CE will feature a suboptimally low (high) number of ￿rms. Note that for translog preferences, the
bene￿t of variety is only half the net markup for any : The competitive equilibrium thus features
a suboptimally high number of ￿rms.
Intuition: The C.E.S.-DS Case
C.E.S.-DS preferences induce two special features in our model economy that jointly deliver e¢ -
ciency: synchronization of markups (across ￿rms and time) and the alignment of pro￿t incentives
with the bene￿ts of product variety.18 The ￿rst piece of intuition, which we will refer to as ￿the
Lerner-Samuelson intuition,￿concerns the synchronization of markups. Lerner (1934, p. 172) ￿rst
noted that the allocation of resources is e¢ cient when markups are equal in the pricing of all
goods: ￿The conditions for that optimum distribution of resources between di⁄erent commodities
that we designate the absence of monopoly are satis￿ed if prices are all proportional to marginal
cost.￿ Samuelson (1947, p. 239-240) also makes this point clearly: ￿If all factors of production
were indi⁄erent between di⁄erent uses and completely ￿xed in amount ￿the pure Austrian case ￿ ,
then [...] proportionality of prices and marginal cost would be su¢ cient.￿This makes it clear that
equality of prices to marginal cost is not necessary for achieving an optimal allocation, contrary to
an argument often found in the macroeconomic policy literature. This point is equally true in a
model with a ￿xed number of ￿rms N, where the planner merely solves a static allocation problem,
allocating labor to the symmetric individual goods evenly.19
Our model generalizes this e¢ ciency property to the case of a dynamic allocation problem solved
under free entry subject to sunk cost, a time-to-build lag, and exogenous exit. This is important
because it implies that the allocation of labor to the two sectors of our economy is e¢ cient, and
it contradicts Samuelson￿ s further claim that ￿If we drop these highly special assumptions [that
factors of production are ￿xed ￿ ...], we should not have an optimum situation￿(op. cit., p. 240).
18Our analysis below echoes points made by Grossman and Helpman (1991).
19Notice, though, that the equilibrium of our model would be ine¢ cient if, for some reason, the number of ￿rms
were ￿xed because agents are prevented from accessing the available technology for creation of new ￿rms. Ine¢ ciency
would arise because the number of ￿rms would be suboptimal.
14We let one factor of (aggregate) production (the number of ￿rms, or the stock of production lines)
vary and show that the market equilibrium is still e¢ cient since all the new ￿rms charge the same
markup.20 This brings us to the second feature of our economy that ensures e¢ ciency.
Despite synchronized markups, entry could lead to ine¢ ciency due to two other possible distor-
tions ￿if new entrants ignore on the one hand the positive e⁄ect of a new variety on consumer surplus
and on the other the negative e⁄ect on other ￿rms￿pro￿ts. Grossman and Helpman (1991) call
these distortions the ￿consumer surplus e⁄ect￿and the ￿pro￿t destruction e⁄ect￿ . With C.E.S.-DS
preferences, these two contrasting forces perfectly balance each other and the resulting equilibrium
is e¢ cient.21 However, when preferences do not take the C.E.S.-DS form, ine¢ ciency arises.
Intuition: The General Case
As Theorem 1 emphasizes, e¢ ciency of the CE requires:
(i) Markup synchronization over time/across states: Goods need to have the same markup at
di⁄erent points in time and in di⁄erent states ￿so markup synchronization only across goods is not
su¢ cient. Just like di⁄erences in markups across goods imply ine¢ ciencies (more resources should
be allocated to the production of the high markup goods ￿a point we illustrate below in the case
of endogenous labor supply), di⁄erences in markups over time/across states also imply ine¢ cien-
cies: More resources should be allocated to production in periods/states with high markups. For
example, if the social planner knew that productivity would be lower in the future (resulting in
less entry and a higher markup), the optimal plan would be to develop additional varieties now, so
that more labor can be used for production during low productivity periods.
(ii) Balancing of consumer surplus and pro￿t destruction e⁄ects: This happens only for C.E.S.-
DS preferences and is violated if the (net) markup function is di⁄erent from the bene￿t of variety
in elasticity form. In this case, even if markups were constant, the creation of a new product would
have asymmetric e⁄ects on the pro￿t incentives driving ￿rm entry and on consumer welfare through
the variety e⁄ect. For example, Benassy (1996) has proposed a C.E.S. preference speci￿cation that
separates the degree of monopoly power from the consumer￿ s taste for variety.22 The di⁄erence from
the benchmark DS speci￿cation is that the bene￿t of variety, ￿0 (N)N=￿(N), is captured separately
by a parameter ￿: With these preferences, while the ￿rst condition for e¢ ciency of the CE holds
20This result, however, does not hold if we relax the ￿xed-labor assumption, as shown in Section 5.
21See also Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) and Judd (1985a) for a discussion of these issues.
22This separation was present also in Dixit and Stiglitz (1975) ￿ a working paper version of Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977) ￿and Ethier (1982).
15(markups are synchronized), the second condition obviously fails since the bene￿t of variety ￿ is
generally di⁄erent from the net markup ￿￿1: The economy ends up with a suboptimally low (high)
number of producing ￿rms if the parameter governing the taste for variety is higher (lower) than
the degree of monopoly power (the net price markup). A feature of this preference speci￿cation
that is important for its welfare implications is that consumers derive utility from goods that they
never consume, and they are worse o⁄ when a good disappears even if consumption of that good
was zero.23
We have established that the competitive equilibrium of our benchmark model with ￿xed labor is
e¢ cient under C.E.S.-DS preferences and explained this result based on synchronization of markups
and the entry mechanism. As should be intuitive by now, e¢ ciency breaks down when there
are di⁄erences in markups across ￿rms or sectors of the economy, as is the case when ￿rms are
heterogenous and/or price adjustment is not frictionless.24 Ine¢ ciency also occurs when labor
supply is endogenous since leisure is not subjected to the markup applied to consumption goods.
However, we shall argue that this does not imply that monopoly power should be removed (absent
entry cost subsidies), since pro￿t incentives are the driving force behind entry (which delivers the
welfare bene￿t of product variety). Instead, a simple policy of subsidizing labor income can be
designed that restores e¢ ciency by e⁄ectively equalizing markups for all the goods the household
cares about (including leisure).
5 Endogenous Labor Supply
To address the consequences of lack of markup synchronization across goods, we now introduce
endogenous labor supply. With a perfectly competitive labor market, this provides a speci￿c
example of the ine¢ ciencies implied by di⁄erences in markups across the items that bring utility
to households. The only modi￿cation with respect to the model of Section 2 is that households
now choose how much labor e⁄ort to supply in every period. Consequently, the period utility
function features an additional term measuring the disutility of hours worked. We specify a general,
23More recently, Kim (2004) studies the role of taste for variety in the determination of aggregate returns to
scale with Benassy preferences. Koeniger and Licandro (2006) develop a model that disentangles the elasticity of
substitution from the degree of market power based on industrial structure rather than preferences.
24For instance, the welfare costs of in￿ ation in modern monetary policy analysis relying on staggered price ad-
justment (e.g., Woodford, 2003) can be easily explained in terms of the Lerner-Samuelson intuition. Staggered price
adjustment implies that ex post markups are di⁄erent across ￿rms, and hence there is dispersion in relative prices.
When nominal rigidity is introduced in the form of a cost of price adjustment that implies no relative price dispersion,
it is time variation in the common markup that induces ine¢ ciency. The policy prescription of price stability can then
be explained in both cases in terms of satisfying the condition that markups be synchronized in order to maximize
consumer welfare. We explore the implications of imperfect price adjustment in Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2008).
16nonseparable utility function over consumption and e⁄ort, U (Ct;Lt), under standard assumptions
ensuring that the marginal utility of consumption is positive, UC > 0, the marginal utility of e⁄ort
is negative, UL < 0, and utility is concave: UCC ￿ 0, ULL ￿ 0, and UCCULL ￿ (UCL)
2 ￿ 0.25
From inspection of Table 2, the two modi￿cations to the CE conditions are that L in the
aggregate accounting identity now features a time index t; and the marginal utility of consumption,
now denoted by UC (Ct;Lt); depends on hours worked. The new variable Lt is then determined in
standard fashion by adding to the equilibrium conditions the intratemporal ￿rst-order condition of
the household governing the choice of labor e⁄ort:
￿UL (Ct;Lt) = wtUC (Ct;Lt): (11)
Combining this with the wage schedule wt = Zt￿(Nt)=￿(Nt), which holds also with endogenous
labor supply, yields the condition:
￿UL (Ct;Lt)=UC (Ct;Lt) = Zt￿(Nt)=￿(Nt): (12)
This, in turn, can be solved to obtain hours worked as a function of consumption, the number of
￿rms, and productivity.
























The Euler equation for the planner￿ s optimal choice of Nt+1 and the law of motion for the number
of ￿rms are identical to the case of ￿xed labor supply, up to the addition of a time index for labor
and to recognizing the dependence of the marginal utility of consumption upon the level of e⁄ort.
The additional intratemporal condition for the planning optimum is:
￿UL (Ct;Lt)=UC (Ct;Lt) = Zt￿(Nt): (13)
The only di⁄erence (with respect to the ￿xed-labor case) between the competitive market equi-
librium and the planning optimum concerns the equations governing intratemporal substitution
between consumption and leisure ￿equations (12) and (13). Comparing these two equations shows
25Note that an utility function that is separable in consumption and e⁄ort occurs as a special case when
UCL (= ULC) = 0:
17that the two equilibria di⁄er as follows: At the Pareto optimum, the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure (￿UL (Ct;Lt)=UC (Ct;Lt)) is equal to the marginal rate at which
hours and the consumption good can be transformed into each other (Zt￿(Nt)). In the competitive
equilibrium this is no longer the case. There is a wedge between these two objects equal to the
reciprocal of the gross price markup, (￿(Nt))
￿1. Since consumption goods are priced at a markup
while leisure is not, demand for the latter is suboptimally high (hence, hours worked and consump-
tion are suboptimally low). Clearly, this distortion is independent of those emphasized in Theorem
1 (even if preferences were C.E.S.-DS, a wedge equal to (￿ ￿ 1)=￿ would still exist, and the CE
would be ine¢ cient). As we shall see below, taxing leisure at a rate equal to the net markup in the
pricing of goods removes this distortion by ensuring e⁄ective markup synchronization.26
6 Optimal Fiscal Policy
We now study ￿scal policies that can implement the Pareto optimal PE as a competitive equilibrium
(or alternatively, that decentralize the planning optimum) when the CE is otherwise ine¢ cient.
We assume that lump-sum instruments are available to ￿nance whatever taxation scheme ensures
implementation of the optimum. Importantly, since the wedges between the PE and CE are state-
contingent, optimal policies aimed at closing these wedges will also be state-contingent. Therefore,
all the policies considered in this section can be thought of as feedback rules that specify the
optimal, state-contingent responses of ￿scal policy instruments to shocks. Since the ￿ elastic-labor￿
distortion is independent of those in Theorem 1, we treat it separately and start by looking at the
inelastic-labor case; we turn to policies aimed at correcting for the elastic-labor distortion in the
￿nal subsection.
Optimal Policy 1: An Entry Subsidy/Tax or (De)Regulation Policy
We start by studying a policy that subsidizes ￿rm entry at rate ￿t: Therefore, entrants pay only
(1 ￿ ￿t)wtfE;t=Zt entry cost in units of consumption, and this subsidy is fully ￿nanced by lump-
sum taxes on consumers Tt. The only equations in Table 2 that are a⁄ected are the free entry
condition, which becomes vt = wt (1 ￿ ￿t)fE;t=Zt; and the aggregate resource constraint, which
becomes Ct + NE;tvt=(1 ￿ ￿t) = wtL + Ntdt after substituting the government balanced budget
26Thus, our results conform with the argument in Lerner (1934, p. 172) that ￿If the ￿ social￿degree of monopoly is
the same for all ￿nal products [including leisure] there is no monopolistic alteration from the optimum at all.￿
18requirement Tt = ￿tNE;twtfE;t=Zt.27 Proposition 1 studies the optimal value of ￿t that restores
the planning optimum.












Proof. The Proposition is readily proven once one observes that under the entry subsidy ￿t the
state equation for the number of ￿rms (5) is una⁄ected and the Euler equation for the competitive
economy becomes
(1 ￿ ￿t)fE;t￿(Nt)U0 (Ct)

















Comparing this with the planning optimum and using the conditions from Theorem 1, we ￿nd the
optimal path of entry subsidies ￿￿
t as in Proposition 1.28
Consistent with our intuition, an entry subsidy will work to align (i) the pro￿t incentive ￿(Nt)￿1
and the bene￿t of variety ￿(Nt) (the ￿rst equation in (14)) and (ii) markups over time and across
states (the second equation in (14)). Speci￿cally, a subsidy is in place in any period in which the
bene￿t of variety is higher than the pro￿t incentive, ￿(Nt) > ￿(Nt)￿1, for in that case policy must
provide extra incentives for entry/investment that are not provided by the market. Moreover, the
subsidy rate is procyclical in order to counteract the time variation in markups: Higher subsidies
are needed in periods/states with a higher number of ￿rms, since it is precisely in those situations
of relatively low markups that extra incentives for entry are needed (recall that the markup is a
decreasing function of the number of ￿rms). Importantly, using only one instrument (an entry
subsidy/tax) is enough to restore e¢ ciency in the general case even if there are two distortions
(di⁄erent markups over time and non-synchronization of consumer surplus and pro￿t destruction,
27Note that an increase in the subsidy ￿t is fundamentally di⁄erent from a fall in the exogenous component of
the sunk entry cost fE;t which does not a⁄ect the aggregate resource constraint. Indeed, the latter is equivalent
to a deregulation policy that would simply legislate a lower labor requirement for opening up new ￿rms without
any ￿nancing needs. Such a policy, while implying a similar free-entry condition, would leave the resource constraint
una⁄ected but would instead change the labor market clearing condition. This explains why the optimal entry subsidy
obtained below is not ￿t = 1, although fE;t = 08t implies optimality.
28Additionally, note that ￿(Nt) ￿ 1 > 0 and ￿(Nt) > 0 imply that the restriction ￿t < 1 is never binding.
19￿(x) 6= ￿(x) ￿ 1). The subsidy/tax rate is not overdetermined since the policy works along two
dimensions: the functional form of the subsidy/tax rate at any given time, and the intertemporal
path of the subsidy/tax rate.
To substantiate this intuition, we brie￿ y review a few examples. As one would expect from
Theorem 1, the optimal entry subsidy is zero when the markup and bene￿t from variety are aligned,
and markups are synchronized over time/across states ￿i.e., for C.E.S.-DS preferences. When only
the ￿rst condition fails (for instance, for Benassy preferences) the optimal subsidy is constant
and simply re-balances the markup and the bene￿t of variety: 1 ￿ ￿￿
t = 1 ￿ ￿￿
t+1 = (￿ ￿ 1)=￿
for any t ￿ 0: When only the second condition fails (￿(Nt+1) 6= ￿(Nt)), we have: ￿￿
0 = 0,
1￿￿￿
t+1 = ￿(Nt+1)=￿(Nt) for t ￿ 1. In this case, the subsidy is used only to synchronize markups
over time and across states. In the translog case, where both distortions are at work, the ￿rst
expression in (14) ensures that bene￿t of variety and markup are aligned and provides an initial
condition for the subsidy rate:
￿
￿translog





hence a tax. Since the bene￿t of variety is only half the net markup with translog preferences,
optimal policy implies more ￿regulation￿ (doubling the entry cost) in the initial period. From
period t = 1, the second condition in (14) fully determines the dynamics of the subsidy rate given
this initial condition, and corrects for the distortion associated with markup non-synchronization
over time and across states.
Optimal Policy 2: A Subsidy to Net Asset Trades
Decentralization by means of an entry subsidy is not the unique way to implement the PE as an
outcome of market behavior in our model. The ￿rst alternative that we review exploits the general
equilibrium structure of the model by noting that, since the decision of ￿rms to enter is mirrored
by a decision of households to invest in new ￿rms, an equivalent policy will try to in￿ uence the
latter. Speci￿cally, a subsidy/tax to net asset trades can achieve e¢ ciency as follows. Suppose that
all net changes in the asset position of the household NH;txt+1￿Ntxt resulting from buying/selling
shares at the price vt are subsidized at rate ￿A
t . The household budget constraint is:
vtNH;txt+1 ￿ ￿A
t vt (NH;txt+1 ￿ Ntxt) + Ct + Tt = (dt + vt)Ntxt + wtL:





For example, under translog preferences, asset transactions are optimally taxed to discourage in-
vestment in ￿rms that would provide ￿ too much￿extra variety, in the sense that its bene￿t to the
consumer would be less than the entry incentive to ￿rms generated by the net markup.29
Optimal Policy 3: A Sales Subsidy
Another option to restore e¢ ciency studied by virtually every paper addressing the possible dis-
tortions associated with monopoly since Robinson (1933) is a subsidy to ￿rm sales that a⁄ects the
pricing decisions of ￿rms. We study this option also in order to clearly relate our results to those
of the literature we discuss in the Conclusions.
Speci￿cally, suppose the planner subsidizes/taxes sales at rate ￿t and taxes/redistributes pro-
ceeds to the ￿rms in a lump-sum amount T
f
t : The following Proposition ￿nds the path of this sales
subsidy that makes the competitive equilibrium e¢ cient:
Proposition 2 A subsidy to ￿rm sales ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes on ￿rm pro￿ts restores e¢ -






Proof. To prove this statement, note that the pro￿t function becomes: dt = (1 + ￿t)￿tyt ￿
wtlt ￿T
f








t : Assuming zero lump-sum household taxation, balanced budget implies: T
f
t = ￿t￿tyt,











Nt: The value of a ￿rm is given
by vt = wt
fE;t
Zt = 1+￿t




















29We refer the interested reader to the appendix for a more complete study of stock market taxes as a way to
decentralize the planning optimum. In particular, we explain why some forms of taxation (such as a tax on total
payo⁄ or dividends) do not achieve the decentralization, while others (such as a tax on gross asset trades) do.




















Combining these conditions yields the optimal subsidy rate as in Proposition 2.
Similarly to the entry subsidy, this subsidy works by aligning the bene￿t of variety with the
incentive for entry. However, note that the subsidy becomes a tax when the incentive for entry
in the current period (￿(Nt) ￿ 1) is less than the bene￿t of variety in the next (￿(Nt+1)). The
current tax rate must be contingent on the number of ￿rms producing in the next period due to the
time-to-build lag embedded in our model: Entrants at time t start producing ￿and contributing
to welfare via variety ￿at time t+1, and the optimal subsidy rate recognizes this lag in the entry-
to-availability process. This is fundamentally di⁄erent from the entry subsidy studied above, since
that policy instrument works directly ex ante on the decision to enter, and not ex post on sales
of producing ￿rms who already entered. The translog example studied below delves more into the
intuition behind this argument.
We now discuss a few special cases for the entry subsidy. Consistent with Theorem 1, equation
(15) implies ￿￿
t = 0 in the C.E.S.-DS case. If markups are synchronized over time/across states
(￿(Nt) = ￿(Nt+1) = ￿), but the bene￿t of variety is di⁄erent from the pro￿t incentive (￿(x) 6=
￿(x) ￿ 1), the optimal subsidy is 1 + ￿￿
t =
￿





t = 1: Hence, the optimal policy implies a ￿ at tax/subsidy rate
1 + ￿￿





For instance, with C.E.S.-Benassy preferences, this is: 1+￿
￿Benassy
t = 1+￿￿Benassy = ￿=[(￿ ￿ 1)(1 + ￿)]:
If the bene￿t of variety and the entry incentive are aligned (￿(x) = ￿(x)￿1), but markups are
not synchronized (￿(Nt) 6= ￿(Nt+1)), the optimal sales subsidy is 1+￿￿
t = (1 + ￿(Nt))=(1 + ￿(Nt+1)).30
But the ￿rst condition for optimal policy in (16) implies ￿￿
t+1 = 0: Therefore, the optimal policy is





; and ￿t = 0 8t > 0:
30For instance, this happens with C.E.S.-DS preferences if time-varying markups arise either from industry structure
(Cournot competition, implicit collusion, etc., rather than monopolistic competition across a continuum of producers
as in our speci￿cation) or as a consequence of an exogenously time-varying elasticity of substitution ￿t.
22If the number of ￿rms is expected to increase, producers are subsidized in the current period in order
to avoid over-saving, which would reduce consumer welfare by causing less bene￿t from variety in
the next period. This result is reminiscent of the Judd (1985b) and Chamley (1986) result that
capital income should be taxed heavily in the initial period and not taxed at all thereafter. Doing
otherwise would distort the intertemporal entry/investment decision in a way that is similar to
the distortion of physical investment decisions introduced by positive taxes on physical capital in
Judd￿ s and Chamley￿ s models.










The numerator of this expression corrects for time-variation of markups under translog prefer-
ences, and the denominator aligns the bene￿t of variety with entry incentives. A tax is optimal
(￿
￿translog
t < 0) whenever the number of ￿rms tomorrow compared to today is such that the ben-
e￿t of variety tomorrow (2￿Nt+1)
￿1 is higher than the market pro￿t signal for entry provided by
the net markup today, (￿Nt)
￿1. In the absence of the tax, there would therefore be an incentive
to under-invest today, implying too little variety tomorrow. This is optimally corrected by taxing
sales today, therefore increasing the incentives to allocate resources to investing in new varieties (the
extensive margin), rather than producing and selling more of the existing varieties (the intensive
margin).
In the remainder of this Section, we address two questions that are related to our analysis of
sales subsidies. First, we show that a labor subsidy can restore e¢ ciency when labor supply is
elastic, and we argue that a labor subsidy is equivalent to a sales subsidy only when there is no
endogenous product variety. Second, we study the conditions under which a policy that induces
marginal cost pricing (as originally suggested by Robinson, 1933) restores e¢ ciency.
Optimal Policy 4: A Labor Subsidy
When labor supply is elastic, there is one more distortion to correct for. E¢ ciency can clearly be
restored by subsidizing labor supply (or taxing leisure) at a rate equal to the net markup in the
pricing of consumption goods and applying a lump-sum tax/transfer to the households. Suppose
the government subsidizes labor at the rate ￿L
t , ￿nancing this policy with lump-sum taxes on
household income. The ￿rst-order condition for the household￿ s optimal choice of labor supply is
23the only equilibrium condition that is a⁄ected:






Combining this with the wage schedule wt = Zt￿(Nt)=￿(Nt) yields:






Comparing this equation to (13) shows that a rate of taxation of leisure equal to the net markup
of price over marginal cost,
1 + ￿L￿
t = ￿(Nt); (17)
restores e¢ ciency of the market equilibrium. This policy ensures synchronization of markups,
consistent with the Lerner-Samuelson intuition described above. The optimal labor subsidy is
countercyclical, since markups in this model are countercyclical (￿0 (x) ￿ 0): Stronger incentives
to work are used in periods/states with a low number of producers.
Note that while the same policy would also induce e¢ ciency in a model with a ￿xed number
of ￿rms, there is an important di⁄erence concerning optimal policy between that framework and
our model. When N is exogenously ￿xed, this policy is equivalent to one that induces marginal
cost pricing of consumption goods by subsidizing ￿rm revenues (again synchronizing relative prices
between consumption and leisure) and ￿nancing this subsidy with a lump-sum tax on ￿rm pro￿ts.
As we verify below, this equivalence no longer holds in our framework with producer entry:
Such a policy would remove the wedge from equation (12), but no ￿rm would ￿nd it pro￿table
to enter (in the absence of an additional entry subsidy) since there would be no pro￿t with which
to cover the entry cost. Therefore, while markup synchronization is necessary for e¢ ciency, it is
not su¢ cient. Absent an entry cost subsidy, the su¢ cient condition states that the planner needs
to align markups to the higher (positive) level. Doing otherwise (inducing marginal cost pricing
while driving equilibrium pro￿ts to zero) would make the economy stop producing altogether.
This highlights once more that monopoly power in itself is not a distortion and should in fact be
preserved if ￿rm entry is subject to sunk costs that cannot be entirely subsidized. Indeed, note by
direct comparison that the labor subsidy ￿L￿
t in (17) is equal to the sales subsidy ￿￿
t in (15) if and
only if there is no bene￿t of product variety, i.e., ￿(x) = 0 for any x:
24Optimal Policy 5: The E⁄ect of Inducing Marginal Cost Pricing
In a general equilibrium model with entry, a policy targeted at inducing marginal cost pricing can
have disastrous e⁄ects. For example, while in the C.E.S.-DS case with elastic labor a sales subsidy
does restore the optimum when ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes on the consumer, this is quite a special
case. When even a small fraction of the subsidy is ￿nanced by taxing the ￿rm (as is implicitly or
explicitly assumed in much of the literature), the optimum is no longer restored, as taxation of the
￿rm a⁄ects the entry decision. When all the taxes are paid by ￿rms, this policy would induce a
disastrous outcome since no ￿rm would ￿nd it optimal to enter. Marginal cost pricing would restore
the optimum. In the C.E.S.-DS case, the optimal split features zero lump-sum taxation of ￿rm
pro￿ts in the C.E.S.-DS case. We demonstrate this point by studying the e⁄ect of a policy inducing
marginal cost pricing in the fully general case. Speci￿cally, suppose the planner subsidizes/taxes
sales at rate ￿t and each ￿rm is taxed lump-sum TF
t for a possibly time-varying fraction ￿t of this
expenditure.
Proposition 3 A sales subsidy that induces marginal cost pricing, ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes
on both ￿rms and consumers, restores e¢ ciency of the competitive equilibrium if and only if the
fraction of taxes paid by the ￿rm, ￿t, satis￿es:
￿￿




Proof. The pro￿t function becomes: dt = (1 + ￿t)￿tyt ￿ wtlt ￿ TF





Zt; so the pro￿t function becomes dt = (1 + ￿t)￿tyt ￿
(1+￿t)
￿(Nt) ￿tyt ￿ TF
t : Balanced budget
implies that total taxes are ￿t￿tNtyt; so the fraction of taxes paid by a ￿rm is TF
t = ￿t￿t￿tyt. It
follows that pro￿ts are ￿nally given by
dt =
￿













To eliminate the wedge between the marginal rate of substitution and the marginal rate of trans-
formation between consumption and leisure, we know that the optimal value of ￿t is such that
1 + ￿t = ￿(Nt); implying dt = (1 ￿ ￿t)(￿(Nt) ￿ 1) Ct
Nt: The value of a ￿rm is given by vt =
wt
fE;t
Zt = ￿(Nt)fE;t: Substituting these expressions in the CE Euler equation for shares yields:









25Comparing this with the planner￿ s Euler equation (7) written for the case of endogenous labor (and
hence replacing U0 (C) with UC (C;L)), we obtain the optimal fraction of taxes paid by the ￿rm,
￿￿
t , as in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 shows that a policy inducing marginal cost pricing can restore e¢ ciency only if
an optimal division of lump-sum taxes between consumers and ￿rms is also ensured. Recall that
for C.E.S.-DS preferences (the most common case in the literature) ￿ = ￿ ￿ 1. It follows that
e¢ ciency is restored by inducing marginal cost pricing if and only if ￿t = 0, i.e., if all the subsidy
for ￿rm sales is paid for by consumers, and none by ￿rms. Otherwise, taxation of ￿rms a⁄ects the
relationship between ￿rm pro￿ts and total sales, and therefore a⁄ects the entry decision. In the
extreme case where all of the subsidy is ￿nanced by lump-sum taxes on ￿rms, ￿t = 1; it is clear
that equilibrium ￿rm pro￿ts become zero, and no ￿rm will have incentives to enter. Clearly, ￿￿
t is
non-zero only when the markup and bene￿t from variety are not aligned, ￿(x) 6= ￿(x) ￿ 1, as for
Benassy or translog preferences. Note that, for the latter, the optimal division of taxes between
consumers and ￿rms is an equal split (since ￿(x) = (￿(x) ￿ 1)=2).
7 Discussion
Our results are related to a large literature studying optimal monetary and ￿scal policy in the pres-
ence of monopolistic competition. An incomplete list includes Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987), Adªo,
Correia and Teles (2003), Khan, King, and Wolman (2003), Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe (2004a,b),
Erceg, Henderson, and Levin (2000), and Woodford (2003) for monetary policy, and Auerbach and
Hines (2002, 2003) and references therein for ￿scal policy. All of these studies take for granted
that monopoly power is a source of distortion due to prices being above marginal cost. A common
argument is that, before correcting for any other distortion (such as dispersion of relative prices
due to staggered price setting, in the case of optimal monetary policy), the ￿markup distortion￿
must be eliminated (for example, in order to make the steady state of the model e¢ cient, before ad-
dressing stabilization around this steady state). As we have argued, the distortion is not due to the
presence of a markup in the market for goods in and of itself, but rather to the non-synchronization
of markups on consumption and leisure. When there is a markup in the labor market too (as in
Blanchard and Kiyotaki, 1987, and Erceg, Henderson, and Levin, 2000), our results imply that
there is only one distortion, related to relative markups, and that only one, appropriately designed
subsidy is su¢ cient to correct it. Moreover, if producer entry is allowed for, markups should be
aligned at the level that ensures the optimal level of entry.
26In a model with entry such as ours, eliminating pro￿ts is not optimal since pro￿ts are needed to
provide the right incentives for product creation. This is in contrast with policy prescriptions that
suggest the elimination of monopoly pro￿ts either directly by inducing marginal cost pricing or
indirectly by creating in￿ ation (Schmitt-GrohØ and Uribe, 2004a,b). The prescription that pro￿ts
should be removed by the equalization of prices to marginal costs (which can be traced back to
Robinson, 1933, pp. 163-165) is omnipresent in the public ￿nance literature studying optimal
taxation in the presence of imperfect competition (see e.g. Auerbach and Hines, 2002, 2003). Since
the stock of available products/￿rms acts as a physical capital stock and investment in ￿rm entry
is similar to investment in physical capital, our results are also related to the literature studying
optimal taxation of capital income, e.g. Judd (1985b) and Chamley (1986). In particular, the
optimality of subsidizing ￿rm entry or investment in our framework echoes the result of Judd
(1997, 2002) that the optimal tax rate on capital income is negative, obtained in a second-best
environment (i.e., with distortionary taxes only). Indeed, our results can be viewed as providing
conditions for the desirability of a ￿negative capital tax￿ (i.e., an entry subsidy), when capital
accumulation takes the form of investment in the creation of new goods, even in an environment
in which access to lump-sum instruments makes it possible to implement the ￿rst-best outcome.31
Finally, our model can be viewed as a generalization of Judd (1985a), who ￿rst studied the optimal
length of patents in a model with product innovation and di⁄erentiation.
8 Conclusions
We studied the e¢ ciency properties of a DSGE macroeconomic model with monopolistic competi-
tion and ￿rm entry subject to sunk costs, a time-to-build lag, and exogenous risk of ￿rm destruction.
Under inelastic labor supply and linearity of production in labor, the market economy is e¢ cient if
and only if symmetric, homothetic preferences are of the C.E.S. form studied by Dixit and Stiglitz
(1977). Otherwise, e¢ ciency is restored by properly designed sales, entry, or asset trade subsidies
(or taxes) that induce markup synchronization across time and states, and align the consumer
surplus and pro￿t destruction e⁄ects of ￿rm entry. When labor supply is elastic, heterogeneity
in markups across consumption and leisure introduces an additional distortion. E¢ ciency is then
restored by subsidizing labor at a rate equal to the markup in the market for goods, thus removing
31Our results are related also to ￿ndings in Abel (2007). The combination of consumption tax and leisure tax
that he considers is reminiscent of our markup plus leisure tax scenario if one thinks of the markup as a tax on
consumption. Under certain circumstances, this tax does not result in ine¢ ciency. When labor supply is elastic,
consumption and leisure taxes must be properly aligned.
27the e⁄ect of markup heterogeneity on the competitive equilibrium.
By studying e¢ ciency and optimal policy in a DSGE environment, this paper contributes to the
literature on the e¢ ciency properties of models with monopolistic competition that dates back to at
least Robinson (1933) and Lerner (1934). The policy schemes that implement the planning optimum
in our model fully specify the optimal path of the relevant distortionary instruments over business
cycles triggered by unexpected shocks to productivity and entry costs. Our results highlight the
importance of preserving the optimal amount of monopoly pro￿ts in economies in which ￿rm entry
is costly. Inducing marginal cost pricing restores e¢ ciency only when the required sales subsidies
are ￿nanced with an optimal split of lump-sum taxation between households and ￿rms. With the
Dixit-Stiglitz preferences that are popular in the literature, this requires zero lump-sum taxation
of ￿rm pro￿ts. Our ￿ndings thus caution against interpretations of statements in recent literature
on the ￿distortionary￿consequences of monopoly power and the required remedies.
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30Appendix
A Homothetic Consumption Preferences
Consider an arbitrary set of homothetic preferences over a continuum of goods ￿. Let p(!) and
c(!) denote the prices and consumption level (quantity) of an individual good ! 2 ￿. These
preferences are uniquely represented by a price index function P ￿ h(p); p ￿ [p(!)]!2￿, such that
the optimal expenditure function is given by PC, where C is the consumption index (the utility
level attained for a monotonic transformation of the utility function that is homogeneous of degree
1). Any function h(p) that is non-negative, non-decreasing, homogeneous of degree 1, and concave,
uniquely represents a set of homothetic preferences. Using the conventional notation for quantities






B No Option Value of Waiting to Enter
Let the option value of waiting to enter for ￿rm ! be ￿t (!) ￿ 0. In all periods t, ￿t (!) =
max[vt (!) ￿ wtfE;t=Zt;￿￿t+1 (!)];where the ￿rst term is the payo⁄of undertaking the investment
and the second term is the discounted payo⁄ of waiting. If ￿rms are identical (there is no idiosyn-
cratic uncertainty) and exit is exogenous (uncertainty related to ￿rm death is also aggregate), this
becomes: ￿t = max[vt ￿ wtfE;t=Zt;￿￿t+1]. Because of free entry, the ￿rst term is always zero, so
the option value obeys: ￿t = ￿￿t+1. This is a contraction mapping because of discounting, and by
forward iteration, under the assumption limT!1 ￿T￿t+T = 0 (i.e., there is a zero value of waiting
when reaching the terminal period), the only stable solution for the option value is ￿t = 0.
C The First-Order Condition for the Planning Problem














































Hence, the ￿rst-order condition becomes:













D Optimal Stock Market Taxes
In this appendix, we delve deeper into the question of what distortionary ￿scal instruments applied
to the stock market can induce the e¢ cient allocation of resources. More precisely, we study two
taxation schemes that cannot restore e¢ ciency and one that can (in addition to the subsidy to net
asset trades explored in the main text). The purpose of studying the policies that fail to restore
e¢ ciency is to gain a better understanding of the interaction of ￿scal policy, the asset market,
and the entry decision. We assume that all the taxes/subsidies we consider are rebated/￿nanced
through lump-sum transfers to/taxation of households. To start with, we consider taxation of
pro￿t income (dividends) at the household￿ s level at rate ￿D
t . The Euler equation in the CE
becomes:
fE;t￿(Nt)U0 (Ct)






























However, this does not in￿ uence the time-variation in the markup, or any other intertemporal
decision ￿the tax system cannot address the existing distortions and hence cannot implement the
optimal allocation. It can implement the optimum only when there is no endogenous variation in
markups ￿for instance, with Benassy preferences.
A-2Next, consider a tax on total payo⁄, i.e., suppose that both dividend income and proceeds
from selling shares are taxed at the same rate ￿P
t . The household budget constraint is:





(dt + vt)Ntxt + wtL;
and the CE Euler equation becomes:
fE;t￿(Nt)U0 (Ct)
































The system is overdetermined (unless preferences are such that ￿(x) = ￿(x)￿1), and the initial tax
rate ￿P
0 is undetermined. The problem with this scheme is that it does not in￿ uence the investment
(entry) decision, and hence it cannot correct for the misalignment of markup and variety e⁄ect.
Finally, for comparison with the subsidy to net asset trades study in the main text consider a
tax on gross asset trades: Each time an asset trade is performed, the household pays a tax  t
proportional to the size of the gross trade. Since short sales never occur in equilibrium, the cost is
always deducted from the proceeds of a share sale, and added to the cost of share purchases. The
household budget constraint is:
vt (1 +  t)NH;txt+1 + Ct + Tt = [dt + (1 ￿  t)vt]Ntxt + wtL:
The CE Euler equation becomes:
(1 +  t)fE;t￿(Nt)U0 (Ct)

















Optimal policy therefore obeys (by comparing the above equation with the planner￿ s Euler equation
A-3(7)):









(1 +  ￿
t):
While the functional form of the optimal tax rate implied by the ￿rst of these equations is the same
as for the entry subsidy ￿￿
t or a tax on net asset trades, its dynamic path implied by the second
equation is di⁄erent. A high tax rate today implies, ceteris paribus, a lower tax rate tomorrow.
Hence, the tax rate can be oscillatory. In the special case in which markups are constant over
time/across states, the optimal policy is  ￿
t+1 = ￿ ￿
t.
A-4